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AN AXIOMATIC BASIS FOR BLACKWELL OPTIMALITY
ADAM JONSSON
Abstract. In the theory of Markov decision processes (MDPs), a Blackwell
optimal policy is a policy that is optimal for every discount factor sufficiently
close to one. This paper provides an axiomatic basis for Blackwell optimality
in discrete-time MDPs with finitely many states and finitely many actions.
1. Introduction
In his foundational paper, Blackwell [4] showed that for any discrete-time Markov
decision process (MDP) with finitely many states and finitely many actions, there
exists a stationary policy that is optimal for every discount factor sufficiently close
to one. Following Veinott [15], policies that possess this property are now referred to
as Blackwell optimal. Blackwell optimality and the related concept of 1-optimality
(also known as near optimality, 0-discount optimality, and bias optimality) have
come to provide two of the most well studied optimality criteria for undiscounted
MPDs (see, e.g., [10, 9, 13, 12, 14, 6, 7]). However, the question of which assump-
tions on a decision maker’s preferences lead to these criteria has not been answered
in the literature.
To address this question, we consider a decision maker with preferences over
U = {u = (u1, u2, u3, . . . ) ∈ R
N : supt∈N |ut| < +∞}. The preference relation % is
postulated to be reflexive and transitive, where u % v means that u is at least as
good as v, u ≻ v means that u is better than v (u % v but not v % u), and u ∼ v
means that u and v are equally good (u % v and v % u). A policy generates a
stream u = (u1, u2, . . . ) ∈ U of expected rewards (see Eq. (3) below), where ut is
the expected reward at time t, t ∈ N. Let Ustat denote the set of streams generated
by stationary policies, that is, policies for which the action chosen at time t depends
only on the state at time t. The principal result of this paper (Theorem 1) provides
conditions on % that ensure that % and %B coincide on Ustat, where
u %B v ⇐⇒ lim inf
β→1−
∞∑
t=1
βt(ut − vt) ≥ 0 (1)
is the preference relation induced by the 1-optimality criterion. To state this result,
we use the following notation: For u, v ∈ U and c ∈ R, we let (c, u) denote
(c, u1, u2, u3, . . . ). If ut ≥ vt for all t ∈ N and ut > vt for some t ∈ N, we write
u > v. The long-run average
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
ut (2)
of u is denoted by u¯ if the limit (2) exists.
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Theorem 1. Let % be a preference relation on U with the following three proper-
ties.
A1. For all u, v ∈ U , if u > v, then u ≻ v.
A2. For all u, v, α ∈ U , if u % v, then u+ α % v + α.
A3. For all u ∈ U , if u¯ is well defined, then (u¯, u) ∼ u.
Then % and %B coincide on Ustat.
This result is proved in [8] on a different domain (the set of streams that are
either summable or eventually periodic). To prove Theorem 1, we extend the result
from [8] to a larger domain (Lemma 2) and show that this domain contains Ustat
(Lemma 3).
The first two assumptions in Theorem 1, A1 and A2, are standard (cf. [2, 3]).
To interpret A3, which is the Compensation Principle from [8], imagine that the
decision maker is faced with two different scenarios: In the first scenario, a stream
of rewards u = (u1, u2, . . .) ∈ U is received. In the second scenario, there is a
one-period postponement of u, for which a compensation of c is received in the first
period. According to A3, the decision maker is indifferent between u and (c, u) if
c = u¯. For an axiomatic defence of this assertion, see [8, Prop. 1].
Theorem 1 tells us that if a decision maker restricts attention to stationary
policies and respects A1, A2, and A3, then any stationary 1-optimal policy is
(weakly) best possible with respect to his or her preferences. (The same conclusion
hold for Blackwell optimal policies since such policies are 1-optimal by definition.)
While restricting attention to stationary policies is often natural, it is well known
that not all optimality criteria admit stationary optimal policies [5, 13, 11]. The
arguments used in the proof of Theorem 1 apply to sequences u ∈ U that are
asymptotically periodic (see Eq. (8) below). We mention without proof that as a
consequence, the conclusion in Theorem 1 holds also on the set of streams generated
by eventually periodic policies.
2. Definitions
We use Blackwell’s [4] formulation of a discrete-time MDP, with S = {1, 2, . . . , S}
a finite set of states, A a finite set of actions, and F the set of all functions f : S → A.
Thus at each time t, t ∈ N, a system is observed to be in one of S states, an action
is chosen from A, and a reward is received. The reward is assumed to be a function
from A × S to R. The transition probability matrix and reward (column) vector
that correspond to f ∈ F are denoted by Q(f) and R(f), respectively. So, if the
system is observed to be in state s and action f(s) is chosen, then a reward of
[R(f)]s is received and the system moves to s
′ with probability [Q(f)]s,s′ .
A policy is a sequence pi = (f1, f2, f3 . . . ), each ft ∈ F . The set of all policies
is denoted by Π. A policy pi = (f1, f2, f3 . . . ) is stationary if ft = f1 for all t ∈ N,
and eventually periodic if there exist p, T ∈ N such that ft = ft+p for all t ≥ T .
The stream of expected rewards that pi = (f1, f2, . . . ) generates, given an initial
state s ∈ S, is the sequence u = (u1, u2, . . . ) defined (see [4, p. 719])
u1 = [R(f1)]s,
ut = [Q(f1) . . .Q(ft−1) ·R(ft)]s, t ≥ 2. (3)
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We define Ustat as the set of all u ∈ U that can be written (3) for some stationary
pi ∈ Π and some s ∈ S, where (S, A, F, {Q(f)}f∈F , {R(f)}f∈F ) is a MDP with
finitely many states and finitely many actions.
3. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 will be completed through three lemmas. The first
lemma shows that if % satisfies A1–A3, then % and %B coincide on the set of pairs
u, v ∈ U for which the series
∑
∞
t=1(ut − vt) is Cesa`ro-summable and has bounded
partial sums, where
u %V v ⇐⇒ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
T=1
T∑
t=1
(ut − vt) ≥ 0 (4)
is the preference relation induced by Veinott’s [15] average overtaking criterion. All
results presented in this paper hold with %V in the role of %B.
Lemma 1.
(a) The preference relation %B satisfies A1–A3.
(b) Let % be a preference relation that satisfies A1–A3. For all u, v ∈ U , if the
series
∑
∞
t=1(ut−vt) is Cesa`ro-summable and has bounded partial sums, then u % v
if and only if u %V v.
Proof. (a) See [8, Theorem 1]. (b) A consequence of (a) and Lemma 2 in [8]. 
That the conclusion in Lemma 1(b) holds with %B in the role of %V follows from
that %B satisfies A1–A3. The rest of the proof consists of identifying a superset
of Ustat to which the conclusion in Lemma 1(b) extends. Lemma 2 shows that this
conclusion holds on the set of u ∈ U that can be written
u = w +△, (5)
where w is eventually periodic and the series
∑
∞
t=1△t is Cesa`ro-summable (the
limit limn→∞
1
n
∑n
T=1
∑T
t=1△t exists and is finite) and has bounded partial sums.
Let U+ denote the set of streams that can be written in this way.
Lemma 2. A preference relation % on U that satisfies A1–A3 is complete on U+
and coincides with %B on this domain.
That % is complete on U+ means that for all u, v ∈ U+, if u % v does not hold,
then v ≻ u.
Proof. Let % be a preference relation that satisfies A1–A3, and let u, v ∈ U+.
Then d := u − v ∈ U+. We show that u % v if and only if u %B v. Take
w,△ ∈ U , λ > 0 and p, T ∈ N such that d = w+△, where wt+p = wt for all t ≥ T
and where
∑
∞
t=1△t is Cesa`ro-summable with bounded partial sums. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that p ≥ 2.
Case 1:
∑T+p
t=T wt = 0. Then
∑
∞
t=1 wt is Cesa`ro-summable and has bounded partial
sums. This means that
∑
∞
t=1 dt is Cesa`ro-summable and has bounded partial sums.
By Lemma 1, u % v ⇐⇒ u %B v.
Case 2:
∑T+p
t=T wt > 0. (A similar argument applies when
∑T+p
t=T wt < 0.) Then∑T
t=1 wt →∞ as T →∞. Since
∑
∞
t=1△t has bounded partial sums,
∑T
t=1 dt →∞.
We show that u ≻ v. Choose T ∗ > T and x ∈ U with the following properties.
(i) x is eventually periodic with period p.
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(ii) xt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ N and xt = 0 for all t < T
∗.
(iii)
∑T+p
t=T wt =
∑T+p
t=T xt for all T ≥ T
∗.
(iv)
∑T
t=1 dt ≥
∑T
t=1 xt for all T ≥ T
∗.
Since
∑T
t=1 dt → ∞, (iv) follows from (i)–(ii) by taking T
∗ sufficiently large. Let
y = w − x. By (iii),
∑T+p
t=T yt = 0 for all T ≥ T
∗. This means that
∑T
t=1 yt, T ≥ 1,
is eventually periodic. Thus
∑
∞
t=1 yt and hence
∑
∞
t=1(yt+△t) is Cesa`ro-summable
with bounded partial sums. Since y+△ = d−x, the Cesa`ro sum of
∑
∞
t=1(yt+△t)
is nonnegative by (iv). This means that d %V x, so d % x by Lemma 1. Here
x > (0, 0, . . . ), so d ≻ (0, 0, . . . ) by A1 and transitivity. By A2, u ≻ v. Since %B
also satisfies A1–A3, the same argument shows that u ≻V v. 
It remains to verify that U+ contains Ustat. For this it is sufficient to show that
every u ∈ Ustat can be written
u = w +△, (6)
where w is eventually periodic and △t goes to zero at exponential rate as t → ∞.
We say that u ∈ U is asymptotically periodic if u can be written in this way.
Lemma 3. If u ∈ U is generated by a stationary policy, then u is asymptotically
periodic.
Proof. Let u ∈ Ustat be generated by applying pi = (f, f, f, . . . ) given an initial
state s ∈ S, so that ut is the s:th component of (here Q(f)
0 is the identity matrix)
Q(f)t−1 ·R(f), t ≥ 1. (7)
We need to show that there exist w,△ ∈ U and λ > 0 with
u = w +△, (8)
where w is eventually periodic and limt→∞ e
λt△t = 0. A well known corollary of
the Perron-Frobenius theorem for nonnegative matrices says that for any S × S
stochastic matrix P and x ∈ RS , the sequence Pt ·x, t ∈ N, converges exponentially
to a periodic orbit (see, e.g., [1].) That is, there exist ρ > 0, p ∈ N, T ∈ N, and
y(t) ∈ RS , t ∈ N, such that y(t+ p) = y(t) for all t ≥ T and where
lim
t→∞
|(Pt · x− y(t))s|e
ρt = 0
for every s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}. Thus we can take λ > 0, p ∈ N, T ∈ N, and w(t) ∈
R
S , e(t) ∈ RS , t ∈ N, such that
(Q(f))t−1 ·R(f) = w(t) + e(t) (9)
for every t, where w(t+ p) = w(t) for all t ≥ T and where each component of e(t)
goes to zero faster than e−λt. If we now set wt = [w(t)]s,△t = [e(t)]s, t ∈ N, then
u = w +△, where w is eventually periodic and limt→∞ e
λt△t = 0. 
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